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The question:  
 
The blurring distinction between public and private in international 
dispute resolution 
 
Introduced by Ramses A. Wessel (Professor of European Law, University 
of Groningen) 
 
It is a truism that international cooperation has moved beyond inter-
governmental state structures and that we have become aware of alterna-
tive processes, actors and output where law-making is concerned.1 State 
territories have not hindered the development of, for instance, global 
supply chains2 and the transfer of regulatory power beyond the state and 
from public to private regulators.3 The current architecture of global gov-
ernance includes a variety of different forms of bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation. At the global level, alongside the more traditional ways to 
create international law through the conclusion of treaties or customary 
law, for a number of decades now there has been a tendency to engage in 
alternative methods to generate international agreement.4 Indeed, alt-
hough for most pressing trans-boundary issues such as trade, investment, 
health, finance and human rights, institutional frameworks have been es-
tablished for many years and are fully operational, regulators have simul-
taneously been looking for less institutionalised forms of rule-making. 
 
1 J Pauwelyn, RA Wessel, J Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (OUP 
2012).  
2 S Marassi, ‘International Framework Agreements and Management of Global 
Supply Chain: Extra-Legal Mechanisms to Enforce International Labour Standards’ in 
this Zoom Out. 
3 B Warwas, ‘The Application of Arbitration in Transnational Private Regulation: An 
Analytical Framework and Recommendations for Future Research’ in this Zoom Out. 
4 K Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’ (2005) 99 AJIL 
581-614; J Pauwelyn, RA Wessel, J Wouters, ‘When Structures Become Shackles: 
Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking’ (2014) 25 European J Intl L 733-
763; and for the European Union: RA Wessel, ‘Normative Transformations in EU 
External Relations: The Phenomenon of “Soft” International Agreements’ (2020) West 
European Politics. 
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One of the most commonly heard justifications for this observation is the 
search by states, sub-state entities and private actors to engage in interac-
tion across national borders that results in more desirable, detailed and 
effective regulation in technical or highly political matters.5 
This development has revealed an entanglement of public and private 
spheres of governance. Public authority, as the argument goes, is no 
longer (merely) exercised by national governmental actors, but (increas-
ingly) by both public and private actors outside of existing state-struc-
tures.6 The examples are well-known: ICANN sets the rules on the inter-
net, the Codex Alimentarius Commission defines our food safety, deci-
sions on pharmaceuticals are taken by the International Conference on 
the Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Phar-
maceuticals for Human Use (ICH), and almost all technical standards of 
products we use on a daily basis are set by the ISO. In addition to that, 
rules often find their basis in complex international arrangements that 
are far less accessible, transparent and comprehensible than regular trea-
ties or national rules. We have accepted that governance by states is grad-
ually supplemented  – or replaced – by global governance in which many 
more actors play a role and where the distinction between public and 
private rules is less easy to make. 
Alternative methods to generate international (legal) rules have gone 
hand in hand with the creation of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms.7 While many of these mechanisms may originate from in-
ternational and transnational private law structures,8 the point is that 
these mechanisms are increasingly to be seen as forming part of the ‘pub-
lic’ world and have clear links with public interests due to the increasing 
 
5 ibid. 
6 M Zürn, A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation 
(OUP 2018). 
7 H Eidenmüller, H Großerichter, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ in J Basedow, G 
Rühl, F Ferrari, P de Miguel Asensio (eds), Encyclopedia of Private International Law 
(Edward Elgar 2017) 58–66; see on the dispute settlement mechanisms connected to 
formal international organizations KJ Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: 
Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton UP 2014). 
8 F Cafaggi (ed), Enforcement of Transnational Private Regulation (Edward Elgar 
2012). 
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influence of, for instance regulatory bodies and norms on individuals.9 
While the term ‘alternative’ in ADR may have related to seeking redress 
in ‘non-legal’ or ‘non-judicial’ forms of arbitration, these days the distinc-
tion between these different forms may be less crucial. Even in public law 
settings, private mediation is often suggested by public authorities and 
systems as a first step or alternative.10 
As underlined by the contributions to this Zoom Out, these questions 
are not only relevant in relation to the changes in the international legal 
system, but also in European law and policies.11 Although the Court of 
Justice of the European Union itself has a role in dispute settlement, in-
ternational fora in which the EU can participate in legal proceedings are 
rare.12 While Opinion 2/13 (on the ECHR) underlined the difficulties of 
a combination of EU law and international dispute settlement, Opinion 
1/17 (on CETA) revealed that external dispute resolution is not neces-
sarily a threat to the EU’s autonomy.13 The Investment Court System 
(ICS) in CETA reveals the idea of protecting the rights of private inves-
tors not on the basis of traditional ad hoc Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment (ISDS), but by a real ‘Court’ with an appeal possibility, with ap-
pointed ‘judges’  that forms part of an inter-state agreement. Here also, 
mediation is suggested as an alternative means of dispute resolution (Art. 
8.20(1) CETA). And, before claims can be submitted to the Tribunal, 
‘consultations’ must have taken place (Art. 8.23(1) CETA). A ‘private 
 
9 See already A Von Bogdandy, R Wolfrum, J von Bernstorff, Ph Dann, M Goldmann 
(eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing 
International Institutional Law (Springer 2010). 
10 Cf KJ de Graaf, AT Marseille, HD Tolsma, ‘Mediation in Administrative 
Proceedings: A Comparative Perspective’, in DC Dragos, B Neamtu (eds), Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in European Administrative Law (Springer 2014) 589-605. 
11 See in general M Cremona, A Thies, RA Wessel (eds), The European Union and 
International Dispute Settlement (Hart Publishing 2017). 
12  See also A Rosas, ‘The European Union and International Dispute Settlement’, in 
L Boisson de Chazournes, C Romano and R Mackenzie (eds), International Organizations 
and International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects (Transnational Publishers Inc 
2002) 49; and F Hoffmeister, ‘The European Union and the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes’ (2012) 11 Chinese J Intl L 77. 
13 Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454; Opinion 1/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341. See 
on the criteria L Pantaleo, ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration in the Light of Opinion 
1/17’ in this Zoom Out. See on the notion of ‘autonomy’ also E Kassoti, J Odermatt, ‘The 
Evolution of Autonomy. Some Reflections on Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the 
Light of Opinion 1/17’ in this Zoom Out. 
4 QIL 73 (2020) 1-4              ZOOM OUT 
 
interest’ element is introduced by the possibility for non-governmental 
persons to submit amicus curiae briefs to the arbitration panel.14 
Recent dispute settlement mechanisms reveal ‘a mix of public and 
private components’,15 which is a clear reflection of the blurring lines be-
tween public (or international) and private (or transnational) forms of 
cooperation. While transnational regulation and informal international 
law-making was booming over the past decades (at the cost of traditional 
intergovernmental cooperation),16 the contributions to this Zoom Out 
underline that this is not a one-way street and that is becoming increas-





14 See art 43 of the Rules of Procedure. 
15 L Pantaleo (n 13). 
16 Pauwelyn, Wessel, Wouters, ‘When Structures Become Shackles’ (n 4). 
